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In 1983, sunlight on clouds nearly triggered nuclear war

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In 1983, sunlight on clouds nearly triggered nuclear war

Soviet satellites mistook sunlit clouds for five US missile launches. One duty officer's 23-minute wait kept the alarm from going up the chain.

Verified · U.S. National Park Service

In the early hours of 26 September 1983, the Soviet Oko early-warning satellites reported five US intercontinental ballistic missiles launched towards the USSR. The duty officer at the command centre near Moscow, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, judged it a false alarm, and he was right. The satellites had mistaken sunlight reflecting off clouds for the flare of rocket launches.

Petrov later described the night to BBC Russian. A siren howled and a back-lit red screen showed the word “launch”, and the system rated the alert’s reliability as “highest”. A minute later the siren sounded again, and the alerts changed from “launch” to “missile strike”. Protocol said his decision had to rest on the computer readouts. He picked up the phone and reported a system malfunction to army headquarters instead.

“Twenty-three minutes later I realised that nothing had happened.” (Stanislav Petrov, BBC Russian, 2013)

What the satellites actually saw

No missiles existed. The satellites had picked up sunlight reflecting off clouds and read it as attacking missiles. Petrov had grounds for doubt. He had helped write the early-warning software and knew Oko was prone to error. A real American first strike, he reasoned, would come with far more than five missiles. Satellite radar operators also told him they had registered nothing.

The timing made the error dangerous. Three weeks earlier, Soviet forces had shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing all 269 people aboard, and East-West suspicion was at a peak. That autumn, NATO’s Able Archer 83 exercise tested command-and-control procedures for nuclear forces. Fearing a real attack disguised as a drill, Moscow moved nuclear weapons to launch sites, and Yuri Andropov was handed the nuclear briefcase.

Petrov was not thanked for that night. What happened to him afterwards is told in our companion piece on his reprimand. The episode stayed secret until after the Soviet collapse, and false alarms were not over: in 1995 a Norwegian research rocket briefly set off Russian alarms.

5
phantom missiles
23 min
waiting for impacts
269
killed on KAL 007, 3 weeks earlier

Sources & references

4 references

Well-established. Corroborated by 4 independent sources.

1 U.S. National Park Service Government On 26 September 1983, just three weeks after the Soviet military had shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, Lieutenant Colonel Petrov was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early-warning system when the system reported that five missiles had been launched from the United States. nps.gov ↗
2 Arms Control Association article Petrov went with false alarm, later explaining he reasoned that if the United States really were to start a nuclear war, it would do so with more than five missiles. He was correct. The satellites had mistaken the reflection of sun off clouds for attacking missiles. armscontrol.org ↗
3 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation research institution fact sheet Then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov mobilized entire military divisions, transported nuclear weapons to their launch sites, and scrambled a fleet of bombers carrying nuclear warheads. armscontrolcenter.org ↗
4 BBC News news "The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word 'launch' on it," he says. The system was telling him that the level of reliability of that alert was "highest". bbc.com ↗
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